



Western Europe has welcomed its new members by shutting the door in the face of
the workers coming from the East and making their road to EMU more difficult. Two
years down the road of enlargement, some countries are now liberalizing worker flows.
Indeed, as shown in this paper, these restrictions are not justified by migration pres-
sures and rely on ill-founded concerns that nominal convergence could delay real con-
vergence. Moreover, they are mutually inconsistent: delaying EMU convergence would
just worsen labour market conditions with respect to a scenario of relatively rapid Euro
convergence, by increasing real interest rates and negatively affecting FDI directed to
the new member states. This ultimately means that delaying EMU convergence may
backfire in terms of stronger East-West migration pressures.
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1 Introduction
Europe is facing one of the most dramatic changes
in its relatively short history. On May 1st 2004, 10
new countries formally joined the European Union
(EU). The new member states are small in economic
terms Ð they have significantly lower levels of in-
come per capita than the EU-15 Ð but large in dem-
ographic terms: the two phases of eastern enlarge-
ment (including the planned admission of Bulgaria
and Romania in 2007) involve more than 100 million
people.
A common market also involves the free movement
of people. In the presence of large differences in per
capita income and wages across countries, this
means migration. But for another 10 years migration
flows between new and old member states will be
restricted because the European Union has wel-
comed the citizens of the 10 new member countries
(NMCs) de facto by shutting the door in their faces.
Actually, it has done worse than that. As there is no
agreement at EU level on a common set of rules to
be applied to the new citizens during the seven-year
transition period, each of the old member states has
decided to establish its own rules without coordinat-
ing with the others. In general, these rules substan-
tially tighten migration restrictions or other restric-
tions for the newcomers.
Supra-national authorities in the EU are also taking
a rather negative stance vis-a `-vis early Euro adop-
tion by the new member states. The standard argu-
ment is that early EMU participation would prevent
the new member states from using exchange rate
and interest rates to absorb asymmetric shocks. Fur-
thermore, it is stressed that the economies of the
new member states are too “weak” to be subjected
to the urigors of the single currency and the Stability
and Growth Pact (SGP). All this means that nomi-
nal convergence with the EMU rules may delay real
convergence, that is, the convergence of per capita
incomes.
Many of these concerns are ill-founded. More im-
portantly, they seem to ignore the interactions be-
tween macroeconomic stability, growth and migra-
tion. A stable macroeconomic framework for these
countries is essential to foster growth and increase
job creation, thereby reducing migration pressures,
which will not be lower in 7 to 10 years’ time, at the
end of the transitional period. Euro adoption could
provide such a stable macroeconomic framework,
reducing the risk of contagion between emerging
markets and bringing down interest rates on public
debt in these countries. FDI, attracted by macro sta-
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bility and the elimination of currency risk, would
also promote stronger employment growth, increas-
ing the job content of growth and hence moving the
new member states away from the jobless recovery
experienced there since the 1998 recession.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 discusses restrictions on immigration from
the new member states. Section 3 analyses the inter-
actions between Euro adoption, employment
growth and migration. Section 4 concludes.
2 Migration restrictions: a race
to the top
Austria and Germany, the destination of four out of
five migrants from Eastern Europe, announced in
early 2003 that they would restrict migration from
the new member countries for the full transitional
period of seven years. France and Belgium decided
to maintain their current restrictions on immigration
for new EU citizens for at least the first two years.
Finland, initially supposed to take a liberal stance,
postponed the opening of its borders for at least two
years and tightened immigrant access to welfare.
The Swedish Prime Minister proposed to do the
same, but his proposal was overruled by a parlia-
mentary vote in Stockholm. Access to welfare for
migrants has, however, been tightened up in Sweden
as well as in the UK. Greece and Italy opted for
quotas on workers from the new member states just
as if they were migrants from countries outside the
EU. On the whole, all the countries bordering the
new member states introduced restrictions to migra-
tion for workers from the “New Europe”.
Two years down the road some of these restrictions
are being lifted. In particular, Spain, Finland, Portu-
gal and Belgium announced their intention to re-
move restrictions to workers from NMCs.
From a political economy standpoint, this tightening
of restrictions is a reaction to the mounting concerns
of the public in the established EU members (the
EU-15) about migration issues. According to a 2002
survey by Eurobarometer, one in two EU citizens
believes that migrants, wherever they come from,
are already abusing the welfare state, and two out
of three consider that the EU should only open up
to countries at comparable living standards. As dis-
cussed extensively by Brücker (2005) and Boeri/
Brücker (2005), closing the door to the new citizens
will hurt EU growth and making the welfare issue
even worse by inflating the ranks of shadow employ-
ment among workers from the NMCs.Tito Boeri Eastern enlargement, migration and Euro adoption
From the allocative standpoint, the new restrictions
will alter the geographical orientation of migration,
preventing migrants from the new member coun-
tries going to the countries where they can be most
productive. In Central and Southern Europe, where
the labour markets have low mobility levels, mi-
grants play an important role by increasing average
productivity, contributing not only to stronger
growth but also to higher per capita incomes. Due
to distortions in wage patterns (wages are often set
irrespective of local labour productivity conditions)
migrants can even reduce unemployment by lower-
ing wages in the regions where the pool of jobseek-
ers is larger.
This additional role of migration Ð flows of workers
“greasing the wheels” of labour markets in presence
of wage compressing institutions Ð is visually char-
acterised in Chart 1. The left-hand side diagram
shows the market-clearing wage prevailing in the dy-
namic regions (the north) which is also used Ð due
to the imposition of the same contractual minima
throughout the country Ð in the south. At the initial
equilibrium, the south experiences unemployment
as the northern wage acts as a binding minimum
wage. Migration flows to the northern region, in this
context, play two useful functions. On the one hand,
they increase employment and reduce wages in the
north by shifting to the right labour supply (as
shown by the bold line, S’). On the other hand, mi-
gration, by acting on northern wages, reduces labour
costs also in the south (from W* to W1) allowing
to partially absorb its unemployment pool (which
shrinks from u to u1).
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Moving now to the effects of restricting immigrants’
access to welfare services, the problem here is that
restrictions on legal migration only encourage
higher illegal flows of workers, which is much worse
from a fiscal standpoint. Unlike legal migrants, ille-
gal workers do not raise revenues for the welfare
state. Foregone revenues are sizeable because mi-
grants are young and work most of the time. Fur-
thermore, illegal migrants tend to be less skilled
than legal migrants. When they are regularized, ille-
gal migrants are more likely to receive social trans-
fers than if migration restrictions had not been there
in the first place. Regular migrants from the new
member countries are generally better educated
than the average EU worker, let alone migrants
from other nations.
A better way to deal with concerns of citizens would
have been to adopt a common transitional quota set
by the EU as a wholeÐenabling the realization of at
least part of the potential welfare gains in the form
of higher growth while providing information on mi-
gration pressures. The quota could have been estab-
lished at a level based on past migration episodes,
perhaps accommodating an annual inflow of some
400,000 people, in line with the “consensus fore-
casts” on the migration potential associated with the
enlargement (Boeri/Brücker 2001).
While transitional restrictions are in place, reforms
that tackle concerns about the future viability of the
welfare system need to be carried out. In seven to
ten years time, when the “transitional period” is
over, differences in incomes between the old andEastern enlargement, migration and Euro adoption Tito Boeri
new members will still exist, and will still be sizeable.
If new member countries are set to grow at an opti-
mistic 5 percent for the next two decades, they will
still not reach the average income of the EU, and
will only barely converge with the income of the
poorest countries. At 5% growth rates in the NMCs
and 2% in the EU, it will take more than three dec-
ades to halve the income gap with the current EU
members. Thus, economic convergence is a long-
term business.
This slow convergence is documented in Chart 2.
Using traditional specifications for long-term
growth equations (as in Barro/Sala-i-Martin 1991,
and Levine/Renelt 1992) and applying the coeffi-
cients estimated on Postwar Europe growth pat-
terns, we can predict a long-term yearly average
growth rate for the NMCs of around 5%. This im-
plies a rather slow process of convergence not only
to the average income of the EU as a whole, but
even to that of low income members like Greece,
Spain and Portugal (Fischer et al. 1998). These esti-
mates are broadly consistent with the rate of ‘condi-
tional convergence’ of 2% found by Barro and Sala-
i-Martin (1991, 1995). Conditional convergence is
the rate of convergence towards the steady-state
level of income of the benchmark countries, taking
account of the effects of a set of variables that influ-
ence economic growth.
As income disparities within the new borders of the
EU are likely to be large for some decades, the criti-
cal challenge facing EU policymakers will be to rec-
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oncile policies that promote mobility with the needs
of its immobile citizens. One solution would be to
coordinate at EU level the programs Ð such as so-
cial assistance Ð that are financed out of general
government revenues. In principle, common stand-
ards could be defined in terms of minimum guaran-
teed income schemes, protecting the countries from
fiscal competition across jurisdictions and prevent-
ing a potential “race-to-the-bottom” in welfare pro-
vision. All EU countries, including the new mem-
bers, could be encouraged to gradually adapt their
social assistance programs (which also exist in the
new member states) in order to meet some basic
income requirements. EU coordination at the level
of these minimum guaranteed income schemes
could then be pursued gradually, with the long-term
intention of building up a pan-European safety net
as one of the pillar institutions of the European
Union.
Another problem which needs to be tackled as soon
as possible relates to the enforcement of border con-
trols in a Union of 27 states, where illegal immi-
grants have thousands of kilometres of border to ac-
cess. The continuous patrolling of such a wide and
diverse piece of land would be very difficult for a
number of reasons:
 First, border controls would need to be coordi-
nated across EU member states, which would in-
evitably require coordination of police activity.
 Second, and most importantly, it is quite likely
that most illegal immigrants would try to enter theTito Boeri Eastern enlargement, migration and Euro adoption
EU at its eastern border, with the intention of go-
ing west. It is likely that illegal immigrants will
ultimately want to settle in the wealthy countries
of Western Europe, such as France and Germany,
with east-east migration being a temporary step in
that direction.
Will the police in the NMCs have sufficient incen-
tives to stop illegal immigrants from temporarily en-
tering their countries when their final destination
will probably be elsewhere? Probably not. This
‘free-rider’ problem is potentially very serious. In-
deed, the United States had a potentially similar
problem across states, and accordingly chose to del-
egate its border controls to a federal authority
(Boeri/Hanson/McCormick 2001). But in Europe,
there is no federal police authority, and there will
not be one in the foreseeable future.
A more efficient way to deal with illegal migra-
tion Ð as most of the east-east migration is likely to
be Ð is to enforce internal controls on firm compli-
ance with immigration law. However, such controls
may not be politically viable options given the toler-
ance of employment in Europe’s shadow economy.
This implies that supranational authorities may be
called also to play an important role in strengthen-
ing worksite inspection and restricting illegal em-
ployment of foreign workers.
Another way to proceed is to establish close cooper-
ation with the likely countries of origin of future ille-
gal immigration. In an EU of 27 members, these will
probably be the traditional Arab countries of North
Africa and Albania, plus the lowest-income mem-
bers of the Commonwealth of Independent States,
countries like Azerbaijan, Tajikistan and the
Ukraine. Unfortunately, the latter group of coun-
tries currently has limited ties with the EU, suggest-
ing the need to establish a long-term policy of close
cooperation with such countries. One way or an-
other, it will be necessary to influence the incentives
for these countries to increase their border controls
and stem the flow of illegal immigrants. Such incen-
tives will involve favourable trade agreements as
well as specific aid policies, all of which represent a
major challenge for European policy-makers.
3 The EMU track
While Western Europe is temporarily closing bor-
ders to workers from the new member countries,
current members of the EMU are making increas-
ingly difficult the nominal convergence of the new
members to the monetary union. Tight requirements
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are imposed on this track. In particular, the require-
ment of spending two years in Exchange Rate M II
has been kept in place in spite of the fact that some
countries come from currency unions and have a
longstanding experience of fixed parities with the
Euro. Moreover, the text elaborated by the Conven-
tion was amended by the ICG introducing new pro-
cedural obstacles to nominal convergence.
These additional hurdles being put on the path to
EMU of the NMCs are inspired by the view that
nominal convergence (convergence to EMU) would
delay real convergence (convergence in GDP per
capita). But this view is wrong for a number of rea-
sons.
First, possession of an independent currency for the
NMCs can be more of a shock generator than a
shock absorber for middle-income countries, ex-
posed to turbulence in emerging markets. Indeed,
the main reason for exchange rate and real interest
rate movements in the region would seem to have
been changes in the risk premium. These changes
were due to world capital market increases in the
premium required of emerging markets, an effect
which would very largely disappear after EMU ac-
cession.
Second, under a stable and low inflation macroeco-
nomic environment, NMCs can be expected to gen-
erate labour productivity improvements much faster
than current EU members and EMU participation
would provide such an environment.
Third, Euro adoption would promote FDIs, contrib-
uting significantly to reducing capital shortages in
the region and exerting positive knowledge spill-
overs on firms in the NMCs, which badly need better
human capital.
All of this means that labour market conditions, too,
are bound to improve in the course of Euro conver-
gence. There is, indeed, evidence that in the new
member states there is a strong complementarity be-
tween capital and labour. Moreover, employment
growth in the region has been found to be negatively
affected by high real interest rates (Boeri/Garibaldi
2004), and real interest rates in the Euro area are
much lower than those experienced by most CEE
economies. Hence, adopting a common currency
would provide an environment of low interest rates
in the years to come, and would probably help these
countries to increase the job content of growth. If
growth were to continue, low real interest rates
would also lead to a reduction in unemployment.
Keynesian arguments are often used to argue that
the fiscal consolidation required to accommodateEastern enlargement, migration and Euro adoption Tito Boeri
Euro adoption could hamper growth and job crea-
tion in the new member countries. However, evi-
dence of the recessionary effects of fiscal consolida-
tion packages is far from uncontroversial: in a num-
ber of cases fiscal consolidation packages involving
public expenditure cum tax cuts did indeed
strengthen macroeconomic performance even in the
short-run. As far as employment growth is con-
cerned, if fiscal consolidation involves a reduction in
wages paid to civil servants, it may avoid the crowd-
ing out of private employment in many low-produc-
tivity jobs (e.g. in the retail trade). Thus, the adjust-
ment required for Euro adoption is far from nega-
tive from the employment standpoint, too.
4 Conclusions
Western Europe has welcomed its new members by
shutting the door in the face of the workers coming
from the East and making their road to EMU more
difficult. Two years down the road of enlargement,
some countries are now liberalizing worker flows.
Indeed, as shown in this paper, these restrictions are
not justified by migration pressures and rely on ill-
founded concerns that nominal convergence could
delay real convergence. Moreover, they are mutu-
ally inconsistent: delaying EMU convergence would
just worsen labour market conditions with respect
to a scenario of relatively rapid Euro convergence,
by increasing real interest rates and negatively af-
fecting FDI directed to the new member states. This
ultimately means that delaying EMU convergence
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may backfire in terms of stronger East-West migra-
tion pressures.
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